contain artifact download paths to the destination directory#47378
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alhudz wants to merge 1 commit into
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contain artifact download paths to the destination directory#47378alhudz wants to merge 1 commit into
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Pull request overview
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Copilot was unable to run its full agentic suite in this review.
Adds path traversal protections to artifact download helpers (Blob, Gen2, File Share) and introduces unit tests to ensure server-controlled names containing .. cannot escape the intended local destination.
Changes:
- Add path traversal checks in Blob, Gen2, and File Share download paths by resolving local target paths and enforcing containment.
- Add unit tests covering traversal attempts for blob, gen2, and fileshare downloads.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 4 out of 4 changed files in this pull request and generated 4 comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| sdk/ml/azure-ai-ml/tests/internal_utils/unittests/test_storage_download_traversal.py | New unit tests asserting traversal payloads are rejected and don’t write outside destination. |
| sdk/ml/azure-ai-ml/azure/ai/ml/_artifacts/_blob_storage_helper.py | Adds destination/target resolution and containment check before writing downloaded blobs. |
| sdk/ml/azure-ai-ml/azure/ai/ml/_artifacts/_gen2_storage_helper.py | Adds destination/target resolution and containment check before writing downloaded files. |
| sdk/ml/azure-ai-ml/azure/ai/ml/_artifacts/_fileshare_storage_helper.py | Adds destination/target resolution and containment check for files and subdirectories in recursive download. |
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| resolved_destination = Path(destination).resolve() | ||
| for item in my_list: | ||
| blob_name = item.name[len(starts_with) :].lstrip("/") or Path(starts_with).name | ||
| target_path = Path(destination, blob_name).resolve() | ||
| if target_path != resolved_destination and not str(target_path).startswith( | ||
| str(resolved_destination) + os.sep | ||
| ): |
| file_data.write(file_content.readall()) | ||
|
|
||
| for f in folders: | ||
| sub_destination = Path(destination, f["name"]).resolve() |
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| sub_client = client.get_subdirectory_client(f["name"]) | ||
| destination = "/".join((destination, f["name"])) | ||
| recursive_download(sub_client, destination=destination, max_concurrency=max_concurrency) |
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| resolved_destination = Path(destination).resolve() | ||
| for item in mylist: | ||
| file_name = item.name[len(starts_with) :].lstrip("/") or Path(starts_with).name | ||
| target_path = Path(destination, file_name) | ||
| target_path = Path(destination, file_name).resolve() | ||
| if target_path != resolved_destination and not str(target_path).startswith( | ||
| str(resolved_destination) + os.sep | ||
| ): | ||
| raise ValueError( | ||
| f"Path name contains a path traversal entry and cannot be downloaded safely: {item.name}" | ||
| ) |
Author
|
@microsoft-github-policy-service agree |
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BlobStorageClient.download,Gen2StorageClient.downloadandrecursive_downloadtake the blob/file/directory name straight from the storage listing and join it onto the localdestination. A stored item whose name carries..segments resolves outsidedestination, so pulling an artifact from an attacker-influenced container or fileshare writes files anywhere the process can reach. Repro: a one-entry container whose blob name ismyasset/../escaped.txt(prefixmyasset/) landsescaped.txtin the parent of the download directory; expected the download to refuse it, actual it writes outsidedestination.Resolve each target and require it to stay under the resolved
destinationbefore writing, matching the zip/tar containment checks already in_local_job_invoker.py. The write site is the only layer that sees the final on-disk path, so a caller passing a trusteddestinationcan't be worked around by a crafted remote name. Regression tests added undertests/internal_utils/unittests.